Public Accountability • Thursday, November 19, 2026

GAO Calls for Stronger Medicare Fraud-Risk Assessments

A November 18 report finds gaps in how CMS evaluates vulnerabilities and recommends four corrective actions.

Gideon Marsh — approved human correspondent in a representative reporting setting

Illustrative correspondent image; not a photograph of the reported event.

By Gideon Marsh • Thursday, November 19, 2026

The Government Accountability Office is calling for stronger fraud-risk management in traditional Medicare, finding that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services has not fully identified and assessed the threats facing its Fee-for-Service program. The report, published November 18, recommends four changes to oversight and risk assessment. The Department of Health and Human Services agreed with three recommendations and disagreed with one. GAO says all four remain valid.

The scale makes the management question consequential. CMS reported nearly $481 billion in benefits for about 34 million Fee-for-Service beneficiaries in 2025, according to GAO. Those are program spending and enrollment figures, not an estimate of money lost to fraud. The review focuses on whether the Center for Program Integrity’s Vulnerability Management Process gives officials a sufficiently complete view of fraud risks before they become major losses.

GAO found that the process does not fully reflect the range of Medicare fraud risks and omits important assessments of likelihood and impact. One example concerns the enrollment screening of medical-equipment suppliers. The agency identified an enrollment vulnerability, but its assessment did not evaluate that vulnerability as a fraud risk in the way GAO considers necessary. The finding concerns the design and completeness of risk management, rather than a determination that every participating supplier is suspect.

The report’s recommendations identify practical accountability steps: establish regular reporting of Medicare fraud risks and antifraud efforts to departmental financial leadership; finalize the Fee-for-Service risk-management framework; complete draft assessments and vulnerability summaries; and update the process to require comprehensive, recurring fraud-risk assessments. GAO’s public recommendation tracker lists all four as open. Agency agreement therefore should be read as a response to the recommendations, while evidence of completed implementation remains a separate test.

The underlying benchmark is GAO’s Fraud Risk Management Framework, which emphasizes prevention alongside detection and response. It also calls for monitoring and feedback so controls can adjust as conditions change. Applied here, the principle is straightforward: identifying a weakness is only part of the task. Managers also need to judge how likely exploitation is, how serious its effects could be and whether existing controls are suitable. That explanatory connection follows from the framework and the new report’s findings.

Another GAO guide cautions that improper payments and fraud are related but different concepts. Payments may be improper because of mistakes, while fraud involves willful misrepresentation. That distinction guards against turning a broad payment-integrity concern into an unsupported fraud total. The public can now track whether HHS and CMS complete the specific management improvements identified in the November report. The central accountability question is whether officials build a documented, repeatable assessment process capable of directing prevention toward the program’s most consequential risks.

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